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Abstract: The role of trust in promoting economic activity and societal development has 
received considerable academic attention by social scientists. A popular way to measure 
trust at the individual level is the so-called “investment game” (Berg, Dickhaut, and 
McCabe, 1995). It has been widely noted, however, that risk attitudes can also affect 
decisions in this game, and thus in principle confound inferences about trust. We provide 
novel evidence, shedding light on the role of risk attitudes for trusting decisions. To the 
best of our knowledge, our data are the first rigorous evidence that (i) aggregate 
investment distributions differ significantly between trust and risk environments, and (ii) 
risk attitudes predict individual investment decisions in risk games but not in the 
corresponding trust games. Our results are convergent evidence that trust decisions are 
not tightly connected to a person’s risk attitudes, and they lend support to the “trust” 
interpretation of decisions in investment games. 
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I. Introduction 
The effect of trust on economic activity and development has received considerable 
interest in recent economic research (e.g., Guiso et al., 2006, 2008; Knack and Keefer, 
1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Sapienza et al., 2007; Zak and Knack, 2001). In order to 
understand the role of trust as a determinant of economic activity, economists have begun 
to investigate empirically how trust affects the individual decisions of, and the 
interactions among, economic agents. This research has led many to question the nature 
of trust, and in particular to question the extent to which trusting decisions are connected 
to risk attitudes. To take one step towards addressing this issue, we here investigate 
whether trusting decisions in the widely used investment game (Berg et al., 1995) can be 
explained by a person’s risk attitude. 
Trusting decisions occur in environments of strategic uncertainty, where another 
person’s decision affects one’s own outcome (e.g., principle-agent relationships). Risky 
decisions occur when the environment includes state-uncertainty (e.g., the outcome of the 
toss of fair dice.) Despite the conceptual distinction, scholars from various disciplines 
have argued that trust and risk are constructs that may be closely related in personal 
exchange contexts (see, e.g., Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001; Hardin, 2002; Cook and 
Cooper, 2003). Knowing whether trust can be predicted by risk attitudes is important: If 
trusting is a risky decision, then policies to promote trust might best focus on creating 
rules that, for example, promote transparency and encourage peer-to-peer punishment of 
trust-violations. In contrast, if trust is not about risk, then such policies might be 
ineffective in promoting economic exchange.1  
                                                 
1 For example, some authors suggest betrayal aversion might discourage trusting decisions (see, e.g, Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser, 2004), and having legal recourse might do little to ameliorate betrayal’s sting. Thus, 
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Experiments in the lab and field frequently use the “investment game” (Berg, et. 
al., 1995, henceforth BDM) to study trust.2 However, several authors (Fehr, 2009; 
Karlan, 2005; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Sapienza et al., 2007) point out that in the investment 
game, inferences regarding trust may be confounded by individual attitudes towards risk. 
In this paper, we offer a novel approach to address rigorously the question of whether 
decisions in the BDM investment game can be predicted by a person’s risk attitudes. 
Discovering how risk attitudes influence trusting decisions in the BDM 
investment game is challenging for several reasons. One is that trust involves imperfect 
information over the likelihood of another person’s decisions (strategic uncertainty), 
while risk is associated with perfect information over the likelihood of outcomes that 
often do not involve another person (state uncertainty). The fact that trust and risk games 
typically differ in multiple dimensions can make it difficult to connect trusting decision 
to attitudes towards risk (see, e.g., Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004, for additional 
discussion as well as a design that takes a first step towards addressing this issue).  
A second challenge is that compelling inferences on this topic are not available 
from analyses based only on distributions of decisions between games. The reason is that 
aggregate distributions of decisions might be the same in trust and risk environments, and 
yet at the individual level decisions under risk might be unconnected to trusting 
decisions. This possibility might help to reconcile the conflicting results of, for example, 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Kosfeld et al. (2005). Both studies report results 
                                                                                                                                                 
knowing how to design institutions to promote trust, growth, and social development seems to require 
knowing whether and how trust is related to risk attitudes. 
2 Earlier “gift exchange” experiments include Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Fehr et al. (1993).  An 
alternative approach to analyzing the role of trust on economic behavior is the use of data from surveys that 
contain direct questions on trust, often based on a question that was pioneered in the World Values Survey. 
Some studies also implement trust experiments within field surveys. Examples of survey-based studies are 
Glaeser et al. (2000), Fehr et al. (2002), Guiso et al. (2008), Ermisch et al. (2009), and Sapienza et al. 
(2007). Trust games are also implemented in neuroeconomic studies (e.g. Knoch et al., 2009). 
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based only on distributions of decisions between games. The former find decisions differ 
between trust and risk environments, while the latter do not.   
Collecting individual-level data on risk attitudes addresses both of these 
challenges. In particular, doing so allows one to move beyond aggregate analyses, and 
adds credibility to inferences regarding causal relationships between risk attitudes and 
trusting decisions. Even with such data in hand, inference can be subtle. For example, 
Eckel and Wilson (2004) investigate how behavior in two-person sequential, binary trust 
games correlates with a variety of behavioral and survey-based risk measures. Among 
their risk measures is a binary “risk” game similar to their binary trust game, as well as a 
Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL) measure of risk attitudes. They find that decisions 
in neither the binary risk game nor the HL game predict decisions to trust. However, they 
also find that HL measures are unable to predict decisions in their risk game. The 
inability of HL risk measures to predict decisions in the baseline risk environment leaves 
it unclear how to interpret the failure of those same risk attitudes to predict trust decisions 
in a similar environment.3  
Earlier studies comparing decisions between trust and risk environments, such as 
those discussed above, have taken important steps in distinguishing roles of trust and risk 
in decision making. Our investigation contributes to this literature by reporting data from 
a new design that, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to address rigorously each of 
the challenges discussed above. Our approach involves combining measures of individual 
                                                 
3 A related point can be made of Glaeser et al. (2000), who investigate (but find only limited evidence for) 
correlations between survey-based attitudinal measures of trust and decisions in trust games. Fehr et al. 
(2002), in contrast, find that survey-based measures of trust are indeed correlated with the sender’s 
behavior in a trust game. However, neither study addresses risk: These authors do not investigate 
correlations between their survey responses and decisions in otherwise identical trust and risk games. 
Similarly, Schechter (2007) compares risk and trust games without providing evidence that risk attitudes 
explain behavior in former. 
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risk attitudes with individual decisions in investment games that do and do not include a 
“trust” component. More specifically, our procedure involves conducting two “trust” 
treatments and two “risk” treatments with the investment game. Each participant played 
exactly one of these games, and the games were run as separate treatments. A summary 
of our treatments is provided in Table 1. 
 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
 
In each trust treatment the trustee is a human, while in each risk treatment the 
trustee’s decision is determined by a computer. In one risk treatment there is no human 
trustee so that the investor faced a standard individual decision problem under risk; while 
in a second risk treatment a computer made a decision for a passive human “trustee.” 
This controls for prosocial impulses that might drive decisions in the trust game 
environment4.  
Moreover, one trust treatment is a standard trust game in which investors receive 
no information about trustee behavior, while in the other trust treatment investors 
received information about “typical” returns (we followed the BDM social history 
treatment.)  Both risk treatments included information on the return distribution used by 
the computer, which was again taken from BDM. This approach allows us to account for 
information differences between trust and risk environments.  
                                                 
4 A study of connections between pro-social preferences and trusting decisions is reported by Cox (2004). 
Our paper is not intended to investigate this issue.  
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Finally, in all four treatments we measure each subject’s risk attitudes using the 
HL risk instrument.5 As we noted above, these data are useful only to the extent that HL 
measures predict decisions in at least one of our treatments. Our key hypothesis is that the 
HL risk attitudes predict decisions in risk treatments, but not trust treatments. We 
investigate this hypothesis in two ways. First, because investors can “opt out” of playing 
the game by simply choosing not to invest, we ask whether risk attitudes predict this opt 
out decision. Second, among those who choose to invest, we investigate whether the 
investment amount is predicted by risk attitudes.  
We find no connection between risk attitudes and the decision to opt out (invest 
zero) in either the trust or risk treatments. Conditional on choosing to invest a positive 
amount, however, we obtain clear evidence that risk attitudes predict decisions in risk 
treatments. We are unable to discover a predictive relationship between risk attitudes and 
decisions in trust treatments. This finding does not necessarily imply that risk attitudes 
are unimportant to trusting decisions, but it does suggest that, to the extent that risk 
attitudes do modulate trusting decisions, the mechanism remains to be discovered. The 
findings thus suggest a fundamental distinction between risks constituted by non-social 
factors and risks based on interpersonal interactions. Methodologically, our findings 
suggest that measures of trust derived from the investment game are not predicted by 
measures of risk derived from a price list procedure.  
Substantively, our results offer rigorous support for the view that motives for trust 
are not tightly connected to risk attitudes. This leaves open the possibility that emotional 
factors such as betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al., 2008; de Quervain et al., 2004; Aimone 
                                                 
5 A variety of procedures are available to elicit risk attitudes, including Abdellaoui (2000), Hey and Orme 
(1994), Wakker and Deneffe (1996), and Charness and Gneezy (2009). 
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and Houser, 2008) play an important role in mediating trusting decisions. Second, it 
suggests that the power of trust to explain various economic outcomes – including stock 
market participation, cash holdings, credit card usage, and foreign direct investments – is 
not entirely due to a close connection between trusting and risky decisions (e.g. Guiso et 
al., 2004, 2008). 
We proceed by presenting the design of our experiment (in section II). We report 
our results in section III, and section IV concludes. 
 
II. Experiment Design 
II.1. Procedures 
The experiments included a total of 291 subjects and were conducted in the experimental 
laboratory of the Sonderforschungsbereich 504, a research center at the University of 
Mannheim. Initially 117 subjects participated in two treatments in November 2005 
(denoted as Trust-1 and Risk-1 in the discussion below), another 96 subjects participated 
in a second trust treatment in April 2007 (denoted as Trust-2), and another 78 subjects 
participated in a second risk treatment in December 2007 (denoted as Risk-2). All 
subjects were recruited from the general student population. The median age of the 
participants was 23 years, and 37% of the participants are female. 
The experiment lasted between 22 and 35 minutes. Each treatment consists of a 
HL risk attitude elicitation task (henceforth, the “HL task”) and a trust or risk game. Half 
of our subjects completed the HL task first, and the other half the trust or risk game first. 
We found no evidence of order effects.   
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II.2. Risk Elicitation Task and Trust and Risk Games 
We first describe the HL task we used to draw inferences regarding participants’ degrees 
of risk aversion. The task is a replication of the price list procedure used by Holt and 
Laury (2002). It involves ten choices between the paired lotteries A and B described in 
Table 2. The consequences of lotteries A and B are the same in all 10 choice situations, 
and lottery B always has a higher variability than lottery A. However, the probabilities 
associated with the consequences of the lotteries change across the rows: While in the 
first row, the probability of the high payoff for both options is 10%, it increases to 100% 
in the last row. A very risk seeking person should thus switch to option B early, and an 
extremely risk averse person should switch over by decision 10 in the bottom row. 
Following Holt and Laury (2002), payoffs for each subject were determined by randomly 
implementing one of the ten lotteries and paying according to the subject’s decision on 
that lottery. 
 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
 
 Turn now to our trust and risk games. The Trust-1 (or T1) treatments follow 
exactly the procedures of the standard BDM investment game. Participants are randomly 
and anonymously paired, and each is endowed with 10 experimental currency units 
(ECU). Subjects exchange ECU for Euros at a rate of one Euro for two ECU at the 
experiment’s conclusion. Each investor can send some, all or none of her endowment to 
her counterpart, the trustee. The experimenter triples the amount sent and provides that 
amount to the trustee, who can then return some, all, or none of the tripled amount to the 
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investor. “Trust” is often measured as the amount investors send in this game, though we 
noted many have pointed out that risk attitudes might motivate decisions to “trust” in this 
environment.  
 The Trust-2 (or T2) treatments were conducted in the same way as T1, except that 
investors were given the information provided by Berg et al. (1995) to their subjects in 
their social history treatment. Participants were told that this was a description about how 
people had made decisions in this game in the past, but were aware that it was not a 
guarantee of how decisions might be made in their session. This treatment is important 
because this information was always provided to subjects in our risk treatments. Thus, if 
HL measures fail to predict decisions in this trust treatment, but predict decisions in our 
risk treatments, it is not likely attributable to differences in information conditions 
between treatments. 
 The risk treatments are also modeled on the investment game, but vary from the 
trust treatments in that the return decision is determined by a computer. In both risk 
treatments investors are shown a graph describing the computers’ true return distribution.  
As noted above, this distribution is taken from Berg et al. (1995), and investors are 
informed that the distribution is based on previous experiments with human subjects.6 
The risk treatments vary in that Risk-1 (R1) is a pure individual decision problem – there 
is no other human involved in the game. It is important to know whether HL measures 
can predict decisions in this game, in order to be able to interpret any potential failure of 
HL to predict decisions in trust treatments.  
                                                 
6 Note that the decision to trust has a positive financial return whenever the trustee returns more than 33% 
of the investor’s transfer amount. 
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Our final treatment, Risk-2 (R2), is the same except that it includes a passive 
human “trustee” whose payment is entirely determined by the investor’s and computer’s 
decisions. We ran this treatment to account for the presence of prosocial motivations for 
investment in the trust treatments. If HL predicts decisions in R2, but not the trust 
treatments, this suggests that differences do not stem from simply the presence of a 
person in the trust treatments, but can perhaps instead be traced to the need to trust that 
person.  
Finally, note that all participants had full information about the game they were 
playing. In particular, all were aware whether the “trustee” decision was made by a 
human or computer. 
 
II.3. Distinguishing Decisions between Trust and Risk Environments 
It is worthwhile to reiterate that our design allows us to compare decisions made in a trust 
environment with those made in an otherwise identical risk environment. That is, our 
treatments are built to control systematically for differences between the two 
environments in pro-social impulses or information. The key remaining difference is that 
in the “trust” environment any backtransfer amount is determined by a human (an 
environment of strategic uncertainty), while in the risk environment backtransfers are 
determined by an automatic process not connected to a human participant (an 
environment of state uncertainty).   
 The investigation of decision patterns between our trust and risk environments 
informs us whether decisions differ between cases of strategic and state uncertainty. 
Further, by collecting individual data on risk attitudes, and then comparing those data to 
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decisions made in our games, we can provide further evidence on the reason for any 
between-treatment differences. For example, finding that risk attitudes predict decisions 
in our risk treatments, but not our trust treatments, is evidence that subjects perceived the 
environment of state-uncertainty as involving “risk”, that they perceived the environment 
strategic-uncertainty differently, and that they made decisions between those two 
environments in different ways.  
 
III. Results 
In this section we first describe our subjects’ risk attitudes as elicited by the HL task. 
Then we show how the distributions of investor decisions differ between our trust and 
risk treatments. Finally, we provide evidence that risk attitudes predict decisions in risk 
games but do not predict decisions in trust games.  
 
III.1. Subjects’ Risk Attitudes 
In total, we observe 204 subjects as senders. Their risk aversion is measured according to 
Holt and Laury (2002) as the (last) point where a subject switches from option A to 
option B.7 Very risk seeking subjects have a low switchpoint, and risk averse subjects a 
high switchpoint. We find a mean switchpoint of 5.86, suggesting that subjects are risk 
averse on average. Similar to Holt and Laury we also find that more than two thirds of the 
subjects (76%) choose more than 4 safe choices, which is the predicted switchpoint of a 
risk neutral subject. 76 (37%) of our subjects are female, and female participants are on 
average more risk averse (mean switchpoint: 6.07) than male participants (mean 
                                                 
7 The vast majority of our subjects (95%) switched only once. As in Holt and Laury (2002), we find that 
the analysis reported in this paper changes very little if we drop subjects who switch from B back to A. 
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switchpoint: 5.75); although this difference is statistically insignificant. Figure 1 displays 
the distribution of risk attitudes for our 204 participants. The distribution of risk attitudes 
does not differ across our four treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests, all p-values > 
0.2). 
 
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
III.2. Investment Distributions in Risk and Trust Games 
Figure 2 shows histograms of investment decisions in the two trust conditions T1 and T2 
(n=48 for both treatments) and the two risk treatments R1 and R2 (n=69 and n=39), 
respectively. Turning first to the trust treatments, their respective histograms have in 
common significant mass at the right tail and relatively flat middle sections. Although it 
is apparent that a greater fraction chose not to invest in T1,8 there is nevertheless only 
weak statistical evidence for differences between their overall distributions (p=0.12, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test); their means (p=0.10); their medians (p=0.11) or their 
variances (p=0.07).9 This finding suggests that the prior that we induce in T2, R1, and R2 
by showing information about behavior in the BDM does not differ much from the prior 
that subjects had anyway.  
The risk conditions R1 and R2 are also highly visually similar, and we find no 
evidence for differences along any of the dimensions described above (p>0.25 for the 
                                                 
8 Recall that T1 is the only case where subjects have no information regarding return distributions. Our 
results might suggest that such ambiguity can have a detrimental effect on participation rates in these sorts 
of games.  
9 Moreover, any suggestion of differences is driven only by differences in participation rates (zero 
investments). As we discuss below, when considering only positive investment amounts all hints of 
differences vanish. 
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distribution test, means test, medians test and variance test). An important first result 
emerges here: In our data, the presence of a human as receiver (R2) does not change 
behavior compared to the same game absent a human receiver (R1).   
Our second finding, which we develop in further detail in the remaining parts of 
the paper, is inspired by the observation that both risk games (R1 and R2) differ from the 
two trust games (T1 and T2). The risk conditions follow a pattern with substantially more 
mass concentrated near the center, and much less at the tails, than is found in the trust 
conditions (T1 and T2).10 As a result the variance of the trust distributions is greater than 
the risk distributions. Indeed, the difference between the variances in treatments T1 and 
R1 is statistically significant (p=0.01, variance ratio test.)  
 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
 
 A source of differences between the trust and risk investment distributions could 
be that risk attitudes affect risky decisions but not trusting decisions. Another is that risk 
attitudes systematically affect decisions in both games but in different ways, or that they 
affect decisions in both games in the same way. The advantage to collecting the HL risk 
preference data is that it allows us to provide evidence on these possibilities. In particular, 
if decisions in both the trust and risk treatments are systematically mediated by risk 
attitudes then the HL data would be expected to predict either both (if HL in fact predicts 
risky decisions in this environment) or neither (if HL measures do not for some reason 
predict behavior in this environment.) On the other hand, the first possibility would be 
                                                 
10 Clustering at boundaries in trust games has been reported by others, e.g., Kosfeld et al. (2005). See also a 
survey by Camerer (2003).  Note that this finding is robust to the participation decision, i.e. it also holds if 
we drop zero investments from the sample. 
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supported if risk preferences were found to be connected to risky decisions, but not trust 
decisions. 
We are not able to detect simple linear relationships between subjects’ HL risk 
attitudes and their decisions in trust or risk games (the simple correlation coefficients are 
small and insignificantly different from zero). Instead, we adopt a type-classification 
approach to discerning relationships between risk attitudes and decisions in our games. 
Type-classification has proven to be a powerful procedure to discerning economic 
relationships that are not apparent with alternative analyses (see, e.g., Houser et al., 
2004). The next section turns to this approach.  
 
III.3.  Investment and Risk-Preference in Trust and Risk Games 
To explore the effect of risk attitudes on decisions in our games we classify subjects 
according to their degree of risk aversion. There are very many ways that one might do 
this11, so our approach is to draw our classifications directly from Holt and Laury (2002). 
In particular, HL draws attention to two particularly interesting patterns: four safe 
followed by six risky (switch at the fifth gamble), and six safe followed by four risky 
(switch at the seventh gamble). Theory predicts the former pattern for risk neutral 
subjects, and the latter pattern for subjects who are risk averse in a way that is consistent 
with what has been found in various econometric analyses of auction data (Holt and 
Laury, 2002, p. 1646). We follow this approach directly, and classify subjects into three 
risk preference categories: those who switch at or before the fourth HL gamble (risk 
                                                 
11 For example, there are 121 unique ways to assign three risk-preference types based on HL switch 
patterns.  
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seeking); those who switch at the fifth or sixth HL gamble (risk neutral); and those who 
switch at or after the seventh HL gamble (risk averse).     
 Table 3 details the relationship between subjects’ risk types and their investment 
decisions in each of our four treatments. For each treatment and for each risk “type,” we 
report various investment statistics: mean, median, high, low, and whether a subject 
invested more than one third of his/her endowment.12 Consider first the trust treatments. 
Mean invested amounts do not vary systematically with risk attitudes in either treatment, 
and we are unable to obtain formal evidence that median contributions monotonically 
increase with risk attitudes (p=0.13 and p=0.82, Jonckheere tests,13 T1 and T2, 
respectively). Moreover, about one-half of each risk type invest four or more in T1, while 
about 4/5 do so in T2. In pairwise comparisons, the fraction of subjects investing four or 
more is statistically identical between types within T1 and within T2 (the minimum p-
value is 0.19 among the three pairwise, two-sided t-tests in each treatment). 
  
< Insert Table 3 here > 
 
 Turn next to the risk treatments, where the data patterns are different. Note first 
that both mean and median contributions increase as subjects’ risk preferences change. 
Means range from 4.7 to 5 to 5.9 as risk type increases from risk averse to risk seeking in 
the R1 treatment, and 4.4 to 5.0 to 6.5 in R2. Medians also vary monotonically in both 
treatments, and these ordered relationships are statistically significant (p<0.05 in both 
                                                 
12 Using a cut-point of 20% or 40% leaves our findings from this analysis unchanged.  
13 Jonckheere (1954) develops a non-parametric test for ordered relationships. In the case of two samples it 
reduces to the Mann-Whitney test. In our case the null hypothesis is that there are no systematic 
relationships among the medians of the different types’ investment distributions, against the alternative that 
the medians are ordered from risk-averse (lowest) to risk-seeking (highest).   
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cases, Jonckheere tests). Strikingly, 90% and 100% of risk-seeking types invest four or 
more in R1 and R2, respectively, while this is true for only about 60% of these 
treatments’ risk-averse participants. Again, these differences are statistically significant 
(p<0.01 for R1 and p=0.03 for R2).  
  
III.4. Participation and Risk Preference in Risk and Trust Games 
Next it is worthwhile to briefly consider what can be discovered about the impact of risk 
attitudes on the participation decision. As can be seen from Table 3, we have few non-
participation decisions (21 in total; 14 in the trust treatments and 7 in the risk treatments). 
Nevertheless, something can be learned by aggregating the human and computer 
treatments. Doing so reveals that in the risk treatments 9.1% of risk-averse participants 
chose not to participate, 6.1% of risk-neutral subjects and just 3.8% of risk-seeking 
subjects. The differences are not significant, but the direction is as one might expect. On 
the other hand, in the trust treatments the corresponding zero-investment frequencies are 
22.5% (risk averse), 11.67% (risk neutral) and 17.4% (risk seeking). These numbers are 
greater than in the risk games,14  but display no systematic relationship to risk-preference.  
To provide additional evidence on the participation decision we conducted a 
probit analysis on the pooled data set. Note that pooling the data is statistically valid.15  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. The dependent variable is whether to 
invest or not, and the independent variables include interactions of a person’s risk-type 
                                                 
14 A greater non-participation rate in investment games with human counterparts, as compared to games 
with computer counterparts, is also reported by Aimone and Houser (2008). Those authors attribute the 
difference to betrayal aversion.  
15 We ran the probit regression model reported in Table 3 using full interactions of the three risk categories 
with the complete set of treatment dummies. Based on this regression we neither reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficients for the two computer treatments are jointly identical (p=0.85), nor do we reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the two human treatments are jointly identical (p=0.38).  
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and the trust or risk condition.16 Also, we include in the analysis dummies for gender and 
economics major, as well as an indicator for age. As is clear from Table 4, our finding is 
that risk attitudes do not seem to have an impact on participation decisions. The 
coefficients are statistically insignificant and small in magnitude.  
 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
 
 Next, we complement the analysis in section III.3 by investigating whether risk 
attitudes predict whether a person who contributes is likely to fall into the low or high 
contribution column. Our discussion and analysis of the data in Table 3 certainly suggest 
this should be the case for the risk treatments, but not the trust treatments. We executed 
the probit model described above using the group of subjects who contributed a positive 
amount, and with dependent variable the decision to make an investment of four or 
more.17 Note that we continue to pool the trust and risk treatments for this analysis, and 
this is statistically valid (tests for pooling yield p=0.54 and p=0.48 in the risk and trust 
treatments, respectively, where the pooling test is analogous to that described in fn. 15.)  
 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
 The results of our analysis are described in Table 5, and are convergent with the 
patterns discovered in our analysis surrounding Table 3. In particular, subjects who were 
classified as “risk seeking” on the HL scale are statistically significantly more likely to 
                                                 
16 In our regressions, the baseline category is “risk seeking × computer”. 
17 One can also conduct a multivariate (or ordered) probit with categories: zero, one-three, and four or 
greater. Doing this leads to the same findings and does not shed any additional light on the issue at hand, 
but complicates the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. For ease of explication we report two probit 
analyses.   
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contribute a high amount in the risk treatments. The effect is also economically large, 
increasing from a probability of roughly 0.75 for risk neutral or risk averse subjects to 
about 0.98 for subjects who are risk seeking. On the other hand, this analysis is again 
unable to produce evidence that risk attitudes relate in a systematic way to trusting 
decisions.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper provided new evidence on the role of risk attitudes in trusting decisions in an 
investment game. We pointed out that addressing this issue rigorously has proven 
challenging, but that doing so is critical as a rapidly growing literature links measures of 
trust to important economic outcomes and provides insights on the design of institutions 
to facilitate economic growth and development.  
Our approach was to examine behavior in investment games in four treatments: 
two “trust” treatments with human trustees, and two “risk” treatments where return 
decisions were made by computers. Like the risk treatments, in one trust treatment 
investors had information on previous human return decisions. Like the trust treatments, 
in one risk treatment a human received any money earned by the computer trustee. In 
addition, we elicited risk attitudes from each of our subjects using the Holt and Laury 
(2002) procedure. Thus, our design accounts for asymmetries between environments of 
strategic and state uncertainty, and also allows for analyses at the individual level.  
 We found that the aggregate distributions of investment decisions with computer 
counterparts (Risk-1 and Risk-2) differed substantially from the distribution with human 
counterparts (Trust-1 and Trust-2). The key difference is that decisions in the trust 
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treatment were more likely to be at the extremes (zero trust or full trust), while in the risk 
treatments the most common decision was to risk about half the endowment. 
Consequently, investment decisions in trust environments exhibit greater dispersion than 
those in risk environments. 
With respect to individuals’ risk attitudes, we discovered that in risk environments 
mean and median investment amounts, as well as the probability of an investment of four 
or more, all increase systematically as participants become risk-seeking. In addition, we 
found that willingness to participate in risk games increases as preferences become more 
risk-tolerant. On the other hand, we were unable to discover systematic relationships 
between trusting decisions and risk attitudes. That we found risk attitudes not to predict 
trusting decisions does not necessarily imply that risk attitudes are unimportant to trust 
decisions. Our findings are also consistent with the possibility that risk attitudes interact 
with trusting decisions in a more complicated way than we have been able to investigate 
here, or in a way that exhibits substantial variability among people.  
 Finally, our results complement a broader literature providing evidence on the 
biological basis of trust and risk. This literature has found, for example, that trust is 
modulated by factors that do not affect risk attitudes (Kosfeld et al., 2005), and that 
trusting decisions are implemented differently by the brain than risky decisions (see, e.g., 
McCabe et al., 2001). Further research on the foundations of trusting behavior, and the 
potentially complex ways in which it is modulated by risk attitudes, would be fertile 
ground for future research. 
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Appendix: Tables, Figures, and Instructions 
 
Table 1: Summary of treatments. 
 
 
Treatment 
Trustor 
(Player 1) 
Trustee 
(Player 2) 
 
Receiver 
Info about return 
distribution shown 
Trust-1 (T1) Human Human Human No 
Trust-2 (T2) Human Human Human Yes 
Risk-1 (R1) Human Computer - Yes 
Risk-2 (R2) Human Computer Human Yes 
 
 
Table 2: Lottery choices in the HL risk elicitation procedure. 
 
Option A Option B 
10% of €2.00, 90% of €1.60 10% of €3.85, 90% of €0.10 
20% of €2.00, 80% of €1.60 20% of €3.85, 80% of €0.10 
30% of €2.00, 70% of €1.60 30% of €3.85, 70% of €0.10 
40% of €2.00, 60% of €1.60 40% of €3.85, 60% of €0.10 
50% of €2.00, 50% of €1.60 50% of €3.85, 50% of €0.10 
60% of €2.00, 40% of €1.60 60% of €3.85, 40% of €0.10 
70% of €2.00, 30% of €1.60 70% of €3.85, 30% of €0.10 
80% of €2.00, 20% of €1.60 80% of €3.85, 20% of €0.10 
90% of €2.00, 10% of €1.60 90% of €3.85, 10% of €0.10 
100% of €2.00, 0% of €1.60 100% of €3.85, 0% of €0.10 
 
 
 
Table 3: Risk types and investment decisions in the Trust-1, Risk-1, Trust-2, and Risk-2 treatment. 
 
Trust-1 treatment 
 
Risk attitude
n n n
Risk averse 3.6 3 0 10 44% 8 17% 3 39% 7
Risk neutral 5.1 5 0 10 67% 12 28% 5 5% 1
Risk seeking 4.7 5 0 10 58% 7 17% 2 25% 3
Total 4.4 4 0 10 56% 27 21% 10 23% 11
0 < Investment  < 4 ECU
%
Investment  = 0 ECUInvestment  ≥ 4 ECU
% %
Mean invest-
ment [ECU]
Median invest-
ment [ECU]
Lowest invest-
ment [ECU]
Highest invest-
ment [ECU]
 
 
 
Risk-1 treatment 
Risk attitude
n n n
Risk averse 4.7 4 0 10 63% 12 26% 5 11% 2
Risk neutral 5.0 5 1 10 67% 20 33% 10 0% 0
Risk seeking 5.9 6 0 10 90% 18 5% 1 5% 1
Total 5.2 5 0 10 72% 50 23% 16 5% 3
0 < Investment  < 4 ECU Investment  = 0 ECU
%
Investment  ≥ 4 ECU
% %
Mean invest-
ment [ECU]
Median invest-
ment [ECU]
Lowest invest-
ment [ECU]
Highest invest-
ment [ECU]
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Trust-2 treatment 
Risk attitude
n n n
Risk averse 5.6 5 1 10 75% 15 25% 5 0% 0
Risk neutral 5.1 5 0 10 76% 13 12% 2 12% 2
Risk seeking 6.1 6 0 10 82% 9 9% 1 9% 1
Total 5.5 5 0 10 77% 37 17% 8 6% 3
0 < Investment  < 4 ECU Investment  = 0 ECU
%
Investment  ≥ 4 ECU
% %
Mean invest-
ment [ECU]
Median invest-
ment [ECU]
Lowest invest-
ment [ECU]
Highest invest-
ment [ECU]
 
 
 
Risk-2 treatment 
Risk attitude
n n n
Risk averse 4.4 4 0 10 57% 8 36% 5 7% 1
Risk neutral 5 6 0 10 68% 13 16% 3 16% 3
Risk seeking 6.5 6 4 10 100% 6 0% 0 0% 0
Total 5 6 0 10 69% 27 21% 8 10% 4
Investment  = 0 ECU
%
0 < Investment  < 4 ECUInvestment  ≥ 4 ECU
% %
Mean invest-
ment [ECU]
Median invest-
ment [ECU]
Lowest invest-
ment [ECU]
Highest invest-
ment [ECU]
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Table 4: Probit regression of whether to invest or not. 
 
           Coefficient   Std. Err.        z       P>|z|      
risk averse × computer     -0.1539     0.4258     -0.36      0.718 
risk seeking × computer    0.2471     0.5342       0.46      0.644 
risk averse × human   -0.5713   0.3755   -1.52   0.128 
risk neutral × human   -0.1089   0.4233   -0.26   0.797 
risk seeking × human   -0.5315   0.4275   -1.24   0.214 
female      0.2316   0.2714    0.85   0.393 
old      0.2875   0.2575   -1.12   0.264 
econ-major    -0.1433   0.2609   -0.55   0.583 
constant     1.3532   0.3485    3.88   0.000 
Note: Number of observations = 204, Pseudo R² = 0.0632. 
 
 
Table 5: Probit regression of investing four or more.  
 
           Coefficient   Std. Err.        z       P>|z|      
risk averse × computer     -0.0636     0.3173     -0.20      0.641 
risk seeking × computer    1.3221     0.5202       2.54      0.011 
risk averse × human    0.1077   0.3148    0.34   0.732 
risk neutral × human    0.2219   0.3227    0.69   0.492 
risk seeking × human    0.5875   0.4153    1.41   0.157 
female     -0.0029   0.2299   -0.01   0.990 
old     -0.3793   0.2287   -1.66   0.097 
econ-major    -0.1618   0.2223   -0.73   0.467 
constant     0.8158   0.2740    2.98   0.003 
Note: Number of observations = 183, Pseudo R² = 0.0683. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the HL risk measure (all subjects) 
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Figure 2: Distribution of investment decisions in the human and computer treatments 
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Instructions for Interaction Game (Player 1)  [ Trust-1 ] 
 
Thank you for coming. These instructions explain how the experiment works. 
 
You have been randomly selected as player 1. Another participant of the experiment has been 
randomly assigned to you; she/he is taking up the role of player 2. Each of you will receive 10 
experimental currency units of money, dubbed ECU. 
 
The game is very short and simple: You have the possibility to transfer some of your 10 ECU to 
player 2. Then player 2 has the possibility to send some of this money back to you. After the 
experiment, you will be able to convert your experimental money into real money, which we will 
pay out in cash. The exchange rate is 1 € = 2 ECU. 
 
And here are the details of the experiment: First, you have the opportunity to transfer all, some, or 
none of your 10 ECU to player 2. Each unit you are sending will be tripled. So, if you are sending 
5 ECU, for example, player 2 will receive 3 * 5 ECU = 15 ECU. 
The amount that you have sent will be displayed on the screen of player 2. Player 2 then has the 
possibility to send some of the money back to you. She/he can choose the amount from any 
number between zero and the tripled amount you have transferred to her/him. In the 
aforementioned example this means that player 2 would be able to send back to you any amount 
between 0 ECU and 15 ECU. The amount that player 2 is sending back to you will not be tripled 
again.  
 
The experiment ends after the decision of player 2. Your payoff is equal to your initial 10 ECU 
minus the amount you have transferred to player 2 plus the amount you have received from player 
2. That is, if you are sending 5 ECU and player 2 is sending you 7 ECU back, then you will 
receive 10 ECU – 5 ECU + 7 ECU = 12 ECU. 12 ECU correspond to 6 €. Hence, you will receive 
6 € from us. 
 
The game is played exactly once in this constellation. During the entire experiment, you will not 
be interacting again with player 2. 
 
Please do not talk with anybody during the experiment and please raise your hand, should you 
have any questions. 
 
You are a participant of a scientific experiment sponsored by the German National Science 
Foundation. All data that you provide cannot be associated with your person and will be treated 
confidentially. 
 28
Instructions for Interaction Game with Computer (Player 1)  [ Risk-1 ] 
 
Thank you for coming. These instructions explain how the experiment works. 
 
You have been randomly selected as player 1; the computer has been assigned the role of player 
2; that is the partner you are playing with in this experiment is the computer.  
Each of you, i.e. you and player 2 (= the computer) will receive 10 experimental currency units of 
money, dubbed ECU. 
 
The game is very short and simple: You have the possibility to transfer some of your 10 ECU to 
the player 2, the computer. Then, the computer has the possibility to send some of this money 
back to you. After the experiment, you will be able to convert your experimental money into real 
money, which we will pay out in cash. The exchange rate is 1 € = 2 ECU. 
 
And here are the details of the experiment: First, you have the opportunity to transfer all, some, or 
none of your 10 ECU to player 2, the computer. Each unit you are sending will be tripled. So, if 
you are sending 5 ECU, for example, player 2 will receive 3 * 5 ECU = 15 ECU. Player 2, the 
computer, then has the possibility to send some of the money back to you. It can choose the 
amount from any number between zero and the tripled amount you have transferred to it. 
 
How does player 2 decide about how much he will be sending back to you? 
 
The computer will be drawing the amount that is sent back to you from the distribution that is 
shown in the picture below. This distribution is calculated from the results of numerous previous 
runs of this experiment in which two real persons have been interacting, i.e. both player 1 and 
player 2 were human beings. 
 
The picture shows: The probability that the computer does not send back any money is about 18% 
(since the value of 0% on the x-axis is associated with a value of about 18% on the y-axis). The 
probability that the computer sends back 50% of the received money is about 7% – and so on. 
 
The experiment ends after the decision of the computer. Your payoff is equal to your initial 10 
ECU minus the amount you have transferred to player 2 plus the amount you have received from 
player 2. That is, if you are sending 5 ECU and player 2 is sending you 7 ECU back, then you 
will receive 10 ECU – 5 ECU + 7 ECU = 12 ECU. 12 ECU correspond to 6 €. Hence, you will 
receive 6 € from us. 
 
The game is played exactly once in this constellation. During the entire experiment, you will not 
be interacting again with player 2. 
 
Please do not talk with anybody during the experiment and please raise your hand should you 
have any questions. 
 
You are a participant of a scientific experiment sponsored by the German National Science 
Foundation. All data that you provide cannot be associated with your person and will be treated 
confidentially. 
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Instructions for Interaction Game (Player 1)  [ Trust-2 ] 
 
Thank you for coming. These instructions explain how the experiment works.  
You have been randomly selected as player 1. Another participant of the experiment has been 
randomly assigned to you; she/he is taking up the role of player 2. Each of you will receive 10 
experimental currency units of money, dubbed ECU.  
 
The game is very short and simple: You have the possibility to transfer some of your 10 ECU to 
player 2. Then player 2 has the possibility to send some of this money back to you. After the 
experiment, you will be able to convert your experimental money into real money, which we will 
pay out in cash. The exchange rate is 1 € = 2 ECU.  
 
And here are the details of the experiment: First, you have the opportunity to transfer all, some, or 
none of your 10 ECU to player 2. Each unit you are sending will be tripled. So, if you are sending 
5 ECU, for example, player 2 will receive 3 * 5 ECU = 15 ECU.  
The amount that you have sent will be displayed on the screen of player 2. Player 2 then has the 
possibility to send some of the money back to you. She/he can choose the amount from any 
number between zero and the tripled amount you have transferred to her/him. In the 
aforementioned example this means that player 2 would be able to send back to you any amount 
between 0 ECU and 15 ECU. The amount that player 2 is sending back to you will not be tripled 
again.  
 
This experiment has been conducted many times with other participants. The picture below 
informs you about player 2’s behavior in previous experiments. 
 
The picture shows: The probability that player does not send back any money is about 18% on 
average (since the value of 0% on the x-axis is associated with a value of about 18% on the y-
axis). The probability that player 2 sends back 50% of the received money is about 7% on 
average – and so on. 
 
The experiment ends after the decision of player 2. Your payoff is equal to your initial 10 ECU 
minus the amount you have transferred to player 2 plus the amount you have received from player 
2. That is, if you are sending 5 ECU and player 2 is sending you 7 ECU back, then you will 
receive 10 ECU – 5 ECU + 7 ECU = 12 ECU. 12 ECU correspond to 6 €. Hence, you will receive 
6 € from us. 
 
The game is played exactly once in this constellation. During the entire experiment, you will not 
be interacting again with player 2. 
 
Please do not talk with anybody during the experiment and please raise your hand should you 
have any questions. 
 
You are a participant of a scientific experiment sponsored by the German National Science 
Foundation. All data that you provide cannot be associated with your person and will be treated 
confidentially. 
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Instructions for Interaction Game with Computer (Player 1)  [ Risk-2 ] 
 
Thank you for coming. These instructions explain how the experiment works. 
 
You have been randomly selected as player 1; the computer has been assigned the role of player 
2; that is the partner you are playing with in this experiment is the computer.  
Each of you, i.e. you and player 2 (= the computer) will receive 10 experimental currency units of 
money, dubbed ECU. 
 
The game is very short and simple: You have the possibility to transfer some of your 10 ECU to 
the player 2, the computer. Then, the computer has the possibility to send some of this money 
back to you. After the experiment, you will be able to convert your experimental money into real 
money, which we will pay out in cash. The exchange rate is 1 € = 2 ECU. 
 
And here are the details of the experiment: First, you have the opportunity to transfer all, some, or 
none of your 10 ECU to player 2, the computer. Each unit you are sending will be tripled. So, if 
you are sending 5 ECU, for example, player 2 will receive 3 * 5 ECU = 15 ECU. Player 2, the 
computer, then has the possibility to send some of the money back to you. It can choose the 
amount from any number between zero and the tripled amount you have transferred to it. 
 
How does player 2 decide about how much he will be sending back to you? 
 
The computer will be drawing the amount that is sent back to you from the distribution that is 
shown in the picture below. This distribution is calculated from the results of numerous previous 
runs of this experiment, in which two real persons have been interacting, i.e. both player 1 and 
player 2 were human beings. 
 
The picture shows: The probability that the computer does not send back any money is about 18% 
(since the value of 0% on the x-axis is associated with a value of about 18% on the y-axis). The 
probability that the computer sends back 50% of the received money is about 7% – and so on. 
 
The experiment ends after the decision of the computer. Your payoff is equal to your initial 10 
ECU minus the amount you have transferred to player 2 plus the amount you have received from 
player 2. That is, if you are sending 5 ECU and player 2 is sending you 7 ECU back, then you 
will receive 10 ECU – 5 ECU + 7 ECU = 12 ECU. 12 ECU correspond to 6 €. Hence, you will 
receive 6 € from us. 
 
The amount that the computer has earned will be paid to one participant of this experiment who is 
randomly drawn from the group of player-2 participants sitting across from you.  
 
The game is played exactly once in this constellation. During the entire experiment, you will not 
be interacting again with player 2. 
 
Please do not talk with anybody during the experiment and please raise your hand should you 
have any questions. 
 
You are a participant of a scientific experiment sponsored by the German National Science 
Foundation. All data that you provide cannot be associated with your person and will be treated 
confidentially. 
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Instructions for the Lottery Game 
 
Thank you for coming. These instructions explain how the experiment works. 
 
In this part of the experiment, you have to answer 10 lottery questions that the computer is 
presenting to you. Each lottery question is a paired choice between two lotteries, “Option A” and 
“Option B.” You will make ten choices between lotteries. 
 
A short example illustrates the procedure. Let us assume that the computer presents you the 
following two options.  
 
Option A Option B 
With a 50% chance, you will receive 2€, and with 
a 50% chance you will receive 10€.  
With a 50% chance, you will receive 5€, and 
with a 50% chance you will receive 7€.  
 
 
This is a ten-sided die. Option A pays 2 € if the throw of the ten-sided lands on 1-5, and it pays 10 
€ if the result is 6-10. Option B yields 5 € if the result is between 1 and 5, and it pays 7 € if the 
results is between 6 and 10. Let us now assume that you prefer option A to option B. We will 
throw a ten-sided die at the end of the experiment, and if the die yields a 7, you will receive 10 €.  
 
Recall, that you will be presented with ten of these decisions in total on one screen. Since only 
one of the decisions will be played for real payoff, another toss of a ten-sided die will decide at 
the end of the experiment which of the ten decisions will be paid out. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose between 
Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows and you 
may change your decisions and make them in any order. When you are finished, we will come to 
your desk and toss the ten-sided die to select which of the ten decisions will be used. Then we 
will toss the die again to determine your money earnings for the option you chose for that 
decision. Earnings for this choice will be added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid 
all earnings in cash when we finish. 
 
Please do not talk with anybody during the experiment and please raise your hand, should you 
have any questions. 
 
You are a participant of a scientific experiment sponsored by the German National Science 
Foundation. All data that you provide cannot be associated with your person and will be treated 
confidentially. 
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Figure A: Information provided with instructions to treatments Risk-1, Risk-2, and 
Trust-2 
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